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In this paper, we analyze the manager's financing decision for a new project. We give the
itanager a choice between financing with debt or equity, or foregoing the project. Our purpose
is to provide a signaling model in which debt, equity and foregoing are actually observed in the
u1 nique equilibrium and the financing mode provides information to the investors about the quality
of the new project to be financed. We investigate how the financing decision is affected by the
value of the existing assets of the firm or by the quality of the set of available projects. We show
that the volume of equity financed projects increases as the opportunity set gets better and that
more equity financing is observed for firms which have large assets in place. This enables us to
provide an explanation for the existing paradox that more equity financing is observed when the
firm's stock price is high. These results also suggest an explanation for why some researchers' have
found that the movement in stock prices due to equity financing is related to the size of the firm.
Our work is most closely related to the seminal paper of Myers and Majluf [1984] and the
extension to a more general setting by Narayanan [1986]. These papers provide a signaling based
explanation for the selection of the financing instrument.2 However, as Myers and Majluf state,
"...the firm never issues equity. If it issues and invests, it always issues debt, regardless of whether
the firm is over- or under-valued."3 Thus, they are unable to explain why equity financing may also
exist. Other related papers are Heinkel [1982] which studies a separating equilibrium in which the
proportion of the funds for a new project which is raised by an issuance of debt signals the quality
of the new project. This result apparently hinges on his assumption that the higher the quality
of the new project, the more risky it is.4 More recently, Williams [1987] has studied the choice
between debt, equity and warrants and the information conveyed by this choice. This analysis is
done under the assumption that the current value of the firm is unknown and does not address the
information about a new project that is conveyed by the choice of financing.5
1 See, for example, Asquith and Mullins [1986].
2 Narayanan has also shown that, in a Wilson anticipatory equilibrium, the capital structure of a firm may be
determined by its production function and business risk.
3 Myers and Majiluf, page 208. Italics in the original.
4 Dropping this assumption essentially leaves the model Narayanan studied.
s There are a number of other papers that have used debt and equity as a signal. These include, among others,
Ross [1977, 1978] who shows that debt can be used as a signa.l about the quality of the firrn while Leland and
In our model, the manager has the choice of financing a new project either with debt or with
equity or he may choose to forego it. We distinguish the firm's costs of financing the project from
the returns earned by the investor. The former will be referred to as "issuing costs" and includes
the costs of mitigating the agency problem. We assume that the costs of issuing debt exceed the
costs of issuing equity based on an argument made by Jensen and Meckling [1976] that a firm
that issues debt will add costly covenants to mitigate the agency problem between the manager
and the debtholders.6 We also assume that the manager (and not the current stockholders) has
private information about the true value of the new project and maximizes the wealth of the
existing shareholders.7 All other information, the value of assets in place, the number of shares
outstanding, the cost of the new project and the additional costs associated with issuing debt, is
assumed to be public knowledge.
In the unique, sensible equilibrium,8 we show that the manager will choose to debt finance
the best projects, equity finance the intermediate projects and forego the worst. For convenience,
we assume that the value of a project which is debt financed is revealed to the market.' The
equilibrium is a partially revealing one in which the value of the project is revealed if it is debt
financed but is not if it is either equity financed or foregone. The fact that the project's value is not
revealed when it is equity financed may permit the manager to equity finance some negative net
present value projects. This occurs because the manager with a negative net present value project
may be able to pool and issue new shares at a sufficiently high price so that the wealth of existing
shareholders is increased at the expense of new stockholders, even if this project is undertaken.10
We also provide an example which shows that the issuance of equity can result in a decrease in the
Pyle [1977] use the proportion of equity held by the owner-manager as a signal about the quality of the firm.
In addition, a number of multiple signaling models have been studied recently. These include Ambarish, Jolh in
and Williams [1986], Constantinides and Grundy [1986] and Viswanathan [1986]. Finally, we note that there
are tax based explanations to the use of debt and equity financing. For a recent survey, see Kim [1987].
6 For details, see the next section.
7 Our assumption is consistent with most of the signaling literature. Another objective function which is used
by Miller and Rock [1985], among others, is a linear combination of the selling stockholders' and the remaining
shareholders' wealth. A more detailed discussion is contained in the next section.
* 'Sensible' refers to those equilibria that satisfy Kreps' Intiutive Criterion. For details, see the Appendix.
9 This assumption is for mathematical tractability in that it allows for an easy description of the highest qualit~y
project that is equity financed. If it were dropped, the equilibrium would consist of two pooling prices, one
for debt and one for equity. Because we are assuming that there is an additional cost to issuing debt, such an
equIilibriut mn exists and our conclusions would not be affected. For further discussion see footnote 22
10 Because the current stockholders are no better informed about the value of the new project tihan the mtarket,
they cannot distinguish between the good and the bad projects themselves until the information about i ts
value becomes public. Hence, if the project is bad, they cannot take advantage of the market by selling before




Another contribution of this paper is that the proportion of projects that are debt financed is
negatively related to the level of the additional costs of debt financing. Hence, we predict that if
these costs differ across firms, those with higher costs are more likely to equity finance their new
projects. Further, if these costs increase through time, there will be an economy-wide movement
toward equity financing of new projects.1 2
Most importantly, we provide an explanation for why the proportion of equity financed projects
is high when the firms' stock prices are high, a fact that has been noted by Taggart [19771 and
Marsh [1982].13 To do this, we note that a firm's stock price is made up of two components, the
part valuing the assets in place and the part valuing the firm's future projects. We show that an
increase in the value of the assets in place leads to an increase in the proportion of equity financed
projects. Similarly, an increase in the overall profitability of the set of new projects leads to an
increase in the proportion of equity financed projects. Therefore, regardless of the underlying
cause, when the firm's stock price is high, our model predicts that more equity financing will be
observed.
The model has implications for the effect of firm size (assets in place) on the movement in
the firm's stock price due to equity financing. If we compare two firms that are identical except
for the value of the assets in place, then the larger one will experience a larger market response to
the decision to equity finance. In other words, the difference in the post-financing prices is larger
than the difference in the pre-financing stock prices.
Our final task is to relate our results to the existing empirical literature. As mentioned above,
the result that the amount of equity financing rises as the firm's stock price rises is consistent with
the empirical work of Taggart and Marsh. Another result, that the larger the value of existing
assets the bigger is the announcement effect associated with equity financing, is consistent with
the recent work of Asquith and Mullins. The last major result is that the manager chooses to
"' In the general analysis, this result depends on the specifics of the distribution function representing the
investors' priors. It is clear from that section that there are a wide class of distribution functions for which
this result holds. Unfortunately, one can also provide examples for which the opposite holds.
12 In the limit, as these costs go to zero, we replicate the conclusions of Myers and Majluf and Narayanan.
13 While the previous results did not require any special assumptions about the investors' priors, the remaining
results are shown under the special assumption that the investors' priors were uniformly distributed.
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debt finance relatively valuable projects, equity finance intermediate valued projects and forego
the rest. The relevant empirical results are that issuing new equity leads to a significant reduction
in the value of the firm while debt issues have an insignificant effect.'4 We see that our work and
the empirical work are both consistent with the pecking order hypothesis though they may differ
in the nature of the effects on the stock price of the firm.15 This difference may be due to the
fact that we have focused on the use of debt and equity to fund new projects and because we have
explicitly ruled out the use of debt to refinance previously issued debt or the use of debt to replace
existing plant and equipment. There is very little empirical work that focuses on the differences
due to the stated end use of the money. The only study to split out refinancing and replacement
is Mikkelson and Partch. They report, for a very small sample size, that the issuance of debt for
uses other than refinancing or replacing capital led to an increase in the value of the firm.16
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide a numerical example to help fix
the ideas and provide intuition for the more general model which is studied in section 3. In section
4, we do the comparative static analysis. Section 5 contains/our conclusions and all of our proofs
are in the appendix.
14 See for example, Asquith and Mullins [1986], and Dann and Mikkelson [1986] who have all documented the
announcement effect of equity financing. For the studies on debt financing, see Dann and Mikkelson [1 986],
Eckbo [1986], and Mikkelson and Partch [1986].
1s In our model, if the manager chooses debt financing, the stock price rises. However, if the manager equit~y
finances, the stock price can fall.
16 The average prediction error was 1.11 with a Z-statistic of 2.73, while the effect of equity financing for the
same class of expenditures was -5.21 with a Z-statistic of -3.06.
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Section 2: The Model.
- We begin with a firm whose assets in place are correctly priced because their value is common
knowledge. The firm has a known number of outstanding shares and is contemplating an investment
in a new project. The cost of the investment is also common knowledge but the return from the
investment is private information known only to the manager of the firm.' 7 The decision that the
manager must make is how to finance this particular project in the event that it is undertaken.
le has two alternatives: debt or equity financing. Under equity financing, the manager issues
additional shares at a price acceptable to the market. Under debt financing, he issues debt at
an acceptable combination of yield and restrictive covenants.18 These restrictiveecovenants are
an implicit cost of issuing debt and are positive.19 We also assume that the manager makes his
financing choice in the best interest of the current stockholders.
We begin our justification for an implicit cost of issuing debt by building on the explanation
provided by Jensen and Meckling as to why the firm issues debt with covenants attached. They
showed that since the manager has the ability to transfer wealth from debtholders to stockholders,
this agency problem is optimally reduced through the use of covenants. This loss in flexibility is an
opportunity cost associated with the issuance of debt which is not associated with issuing equity.
We have assumed that the manager makes this decision in the best interests of the existing
stockholders by maximizing the value of existing shares.20 This assumption is usually justified in
one of the following ways. First, if the manager owns shares in the firm, and if he is not constrained
contractually by the current stockholders, then it is in his own best interest to maximize the value
of his holdings. Alternatively, the assumption may be justified by an appeal to the contracting
literature. In that case, we assume that the stockholders choose the extreme contact hat causes the
17 We adopt this convention rather than assuming that the NPV of the project is unknown so that we may study
the effects of a change in the profitability of the set of potential projects.
18 For convenience, we assume that the optimal form of debt for the firm has a yield equal to the discount rate
and at least one costly covenant.
19 We also assume that there are no implicit costs of issuing equity.
20 This assumption is the one used by Myers and Majiuf, Narayanan, and Ambarish, John and Williams among
others. Also, because the original number of shares outstanding is constant, maximizing the value of the firm is
the same as maximizing the value of just one share. This is equivalent to assuming that the manager maximizes
the terminal value of the firm, that is, the firm value after the quality of the project is revealed.
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manager to act in their best interest.2 1 The other standard candidate for the manager's objective
fuuctioi, used recently by Miller and Rock, is a weighted average of the current and future value
of a share. Our results are only slightly affected if we were to adopt this objective function so long
as the manager places weight on the current stockholders. All that changes are the cut-off values
and the parameter restrictions derived below.
One implication of this assumption is that the manager will not choose to undertake the new
project if the present discounted value of the stream of expected earnings is such that it reduces
the value of existing shares. In order for the manager to issue debt, we assume that he incurs the
cost mentioned above and we note that he will not choose to debt finance if the net present value
of the project is negative.2 2
If the manager equity finances the project, he needs to sell enough additional shares at the
chosen issuing price to finance the project. This is accomplished only if the issuing price he chooses
induces sufficient demand. In fact, in some cases, this may occur even if the project has negative
net present value. Clearly, this may only arise if the investors are unable to infer the true value of
the project from the manager's actions, i.e., if we have some type of pooling equilibrium. Below,
our example and our analysis of the model show that this situation does, in fact, arise.
More formally, we assume that the true value of the assets in place, V, the cost of the project,
I, the additional issuing cost of debt, C (or its per share equivalent c) and the current number
of outstanding shares, n, are all common knowledge. From this, the per share value of assets in
place, PA, can be computed as .The present value of the stream of returns earned by the new
investment project, R, is the manager's private information and as such is not known to either
the market or the current stockholders. We assume that the investors' common prior over R is
characterized by the cumulative distribution function F with support [Re, Rh].2 3
21 It is clear that it would be more satisfactory to derive this behavioral assumption as a consequence of the
optimal contract between the current stockholders and the manager.
22 This follows from the assumption that if debt is issued, the true value of the investment project is revealed
to the market. This is not a restrictive assumption because having already shown that issuing debt causes the
manager to incur some implicit costs (due to the covenants), adding another source of additional costs (those
costs incurred to reveal the quality of the project) sirnply increases these costs. Since our results depend only
on these costs being positive, adding another positive component does not change any of our conclusions.
23 Until we reach the comparative statics section, there is no need to place any additional restrictions, such as
continuity or absolute continuity on the distribution function F.
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In the event that the manager chooses to equity finance, we denote the issuing price by p
and compute the number of additional shares issued to finance the new project, n1, as I. If the
P
manager's choice of financing mode and the resulting issuing price reveals the manager's private
- in formation, then p must equal the true (post investment) stock price, p(R). If the manager's
choice does not fully reveal his private information then conditional on the investors' inference, p
must be not larger than the expected true price.
To illustrate and provide intuition for our results, we present an example. Let V = 500,I =
1000, n = 50, and let the investors' prior be uniform over {900,1300,1600}. Note that PA = 10.
Since the manager knows the true value of R, his decision will, in general, depend on it. Thus, we
must compute his best action for each possible value of R.
For R = 900, the project has net present value of -100. Consequently, as we mentioned above,
the manager will not choose to debt finance. This follows from the fact that the (post investment)
share price is V+R-I-C which is less than PA = V/n when R <I+ C. Consequently, he can either
equity finance this project, if possible, or forego the project.
For R = 1300, the project has a positive net present value of 300. If the manager debt finances
this project, then the post investment price per share is p(1300) = 500+130-1000 - c = 16 - c.
Similarly, for R = 1600, p(1600 ) = 22 - c.
Now consider the manager's decision to equity finance. We begin by computing the mini-
mum issue price at which the manager would choose to issue equity rather than his next best
alternative.2 4 For R = 900, the manager's best alternative is to forego the project. Thus he equity




Solving for the issue prices that he would accept, we find that p > 100/9 - <(900). Notice that
he is unable to equity finance if the market infers R correctly, because the maximum price that
the investors would pay is less than PA and the minimum price the manager would accept is not
smaller than PA.
24 The analysis that follows is done under the assumption that the manager precommits to invest the funds in
the project for which they were raised. However, if the project is a negative NPV project, both old and new
stockholders would benefit from releasing him from this commitment after the money has been raised because
undertaking the project reduces the value of the firm. A discussion of the differences in the analysis when the
manager does not precommit is postponed to sections 3 and 4.
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For R = 1300, the manager's next best alternative depends on C. He prefers debt financing
to foregoing the project if c < 6 because for all such c, the terminal value of a share is larger if the
project is debt financed rather than foregone. Thus, he equity finances if
V+R m+RV+-I V
> max - c, - .
n+n1~ n n
Substituting for n1 , if c < 6, then he will equity finance if the issuing price is at least 20(16-c) _gg20+c
4(1300). Otherwise, he will equity finance if R PA which is equivalent to p 23 . For
-fl 
3 -PA
R = 1600, the manager's next best alternative is debt financing if c < 12. Thus, he will equity
finance if p 20 2-c) - x(1600) if c < 12 and x(1600) = 42 3A otherwise.25
Unfortunately, the minimum issuing price is not necessarily monotonic. This follows from the
fact that the next best alternative depends upon whether R > I + C or not. For small C, the
relevant alternative is debt financing in the former case and to forego the project in the latter
case. The intuition for this is the following. If R > I + C, then the manager is less willing to
choose equity financing for large values of R as the issue price is less than the post-investment
stock price. However, if the old stockholders lose more if the project is debt financed, then they
are willing to accept this wealth transfer to the new stockholders. If R < I+ C, then the manager
is more willing to issue equity for large values of R as the losses from undertaking the negative
NPV project are more than offset by the wealth transfer from the new to the old stockholders.
The new stockholders accept this possibility because, on average, they earn a normal return on
their investment.
We now investigate the pooling equilibria in our example.26 We begin by considering the
possibility of a complete pooling equilibrium. That is, we consider the parameter values for which
the manager chooses the same issuing price, p, for all R, which makes E[R I p] = E[R]. For this
to be an equilibrium, it must be the case that the investors' expectation of the future stock price
(at the time R is revealed) given equity financing is at least the issuing price. Otherwise, the new
investors would not purchase the newly issued shares.
25 Notice that these minimum issuing prices may well be less than PA. This may occur because the c:urrent
stockholders would be willing to transfer a portion of the profits from the investment to the new stockholders
if no other means of financing the project is preferred.
26 In the Appendix, we show that when R is a continuous random variable, no separating equilibrium exists.
Since, in the example, R is a discrete random variable, a separating equilibrium may exist for certain values
of C. As this is special to the example, we ignore it in the following discussion.
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'lhus, to ensure that equity financing is the manager's choice independent of R we must have
an issue price p such that
p max{x(1600), x(900)},
because 4(1600) > (1300). A straightforward computation shows that x(1600) > (900) if c < 7.
If c is larger, then the issuing price must exceed x(900) which is equal to 9°. If c is not larger
then the issuing price must exceed x(1600) for there to be a complete pooling equilibrium.
We know one other important fact. The manager prefers higher issuing prices to lower issuing
prices. Thus, the manager that chooses to issue equity will choose the highest issuing price that
induces the new investors to purchase the newly issued shares. Above we computed the new
investors' expectation of the value of a newly issued share under the hypothesis that every project
was equity financed. Thus, the candidate equilibrium issuing price is that price which is just equal
to their expectation. Letting pe be this price, it satisfies
e V + E[R] _500 + (3800)
n + (I/pe) 50+ (1000/pe)'
Solving, we obtain pe = 15}. For this to be an equilibrium, it must be that every project would
be equity financed.2 7 Otherwise, the investors' expectations would have been wrong.
Clearly, 15}is larger than 19 so that if c > 7 then the project will be equity financed regardless
of R.2s If c < 7 then the largest minimum issuing price is x(1600). For this to be an equilibrium,
we obtain another constraint onc. That is, 15}1> 4(1600) if and only if c > 3}. Thus, if c > 35j,
then the manager chooses to equity finance and sell at pe = 15j regardless of R. Furthermore,
once the value of R is revealed with the passage of time, the true value of the firm's shares
becomes p(R) V+. That is, p(900) = 1400/[50 + (1000/(15.33))] = 12.15, p(1300) = 15.62,
and p(1600) = 18.23.
It is left to consider what happens if c < 35}. In this case, we know that if the investors believe
that equity financing will be chosen regardless of R, the firm with R = 1600 will not equity finance.
So hypothesize an equilibrium in which debt financing is used if R = 1600 but equity financing
is used otherwise. In such an equilibrium, the investors' expected future stock price conditional
27 In this example, we do not specify the investors' off-the-equilibritum path beliefs. We implicitly take them
to be consistent with Kreps' Intuitive Criterion and show that we are studying the sensible non-separating
equilibrium in the Appendix.
28 Recall that, in this case, the largest minimum issuing price is @(900).
9
on equity financing is now computed as if the manager will choose to equity finance only when
R equals 900 or 1300. Thus, this expected price is -. Obviously, this is smaller than their
expectation in the previous case.




For this candidate to be an equilibrium issuing price, it must be larger than the largest minimum
issuing price for the projects that are to be equity financed. Again, we must distinguish between
the case in which 4(900) > x(1300) and when it is not.2 9 If it is, then the appropriate largest
minimum issuing price is 19 . If it is not, then the largest minimum issuing price is 4(1300).
Obviously, 12 exceeds 100. Thus, we must find the conditions on c under which 12 also exceeds
(1300). Simple computations show that this holds for c > 21. Consequently, if 34 > c > 22
then we have an equilibrium in which the manager issues debt to finance the project if R = 1600
and issues equity at pe = 12 otherwise. That is, we have a partially pooling equilibrium. In
this case, the firm's stock price when R becomes known either through the passage of time (for
R = 900 or 1300) or through debt financing (R = 1600) is computed as follows. If R = 900, then
p(900) = 1400/[50 + (1000/12)] = 10}. Similarly, p(1300) = 13}. If R = 1600, then the firm (ebt
finances and p(1600) = 22 - c. Proceeding in this manner, it is easy to show that we cannot have
equity financing for c < 2) as it is not possible to maintain a partially pooling equilibrium.30
From the above discussion, it is clear that when c < 21, the equilibrium has no equity issued.
Thus, the stock price when R is revealed is p(900) = 10, p(1300) = 16 - c and p(1600) = 22 - c.
This follows from the fact that the manager chooses to forego the project if R = 900 and debt
finance it otherwise.
Next we turn to a computation of the firm's current stock price. We can decompose it into
two components, the component due to the value of the assets in place and the component due to
future investment possibilities. So consider the stock price prior to the firm's investment decision
29 Note that if 7 > c ;> 6, then +(1300) = 4(900) because the manager's best alternative is to forego the project
rather than debt finance it for these values of c.
30 The reason a separating equilibrium exists in this examnple is because we have taken the set of possible values
of R to be discrete.
10
when c > 33. Letting p' be this price, we see that
p' = jp(R) = 15 .
R
Notice that this is exactly the issuing price in this pooling equilibrium. This is to be expected
because no new information about the quality of the project (R) is revealed when the manager
equity finances regardless of the value of R.
Now consider the case when 34 > c 2}. As we showed above, if R is either 900 or 1300,
then the manager equity finances the project and if R is 1600, then the project is debt financed.
Thus, the stock price prior to the firm's investment decision is
1
p8 = -10.5 + 13.5 + (22 - c)].
3
Letting c = 3, we get that p' = 14}. Notice that the equity issuing price, 12, is less than this
expectation which means that the firms that equity finance suffer a decrease in their stock price,
a fact consistent with many empirical studies. The intuition for this result is not that the firms
are necessarily investing in projects with negative returns but that the choice of the financing
instrument signals information to the market. In equilibrium, if the project has R = 1600, it is
debt financed and the stock price rises from 141 to 19. However, the two lower quality projects
are equity financed and observing this, their value falls from 14} to 12. Note that the manager
with the project with R = 1300 willingly suffers this loss as debt financing gives him a terminal
value of 13 instead of 13.5. The manager of the firm with R = 900 is prepared to accept the fall in
the firm's stock price (from 141 to 12) as his next best alternative, foregoing the project, reduces
the value even more (to 10).31 In this example, the original stockholders actually do better if the
manager accepts the negative NPV project as the new shareholders transfer to them an amount
greater than the loss from accepting the project.
The intuition that we can get from the example is as follows. First, if c = 0, we will not
observe equity financing.as no type of pooling is supportable as an equilibrium. Thus, if there are
no additional costs to issuing debt, then only positive net present value projects are undertaken
and all are debt financed."2 Second, if 36 > c 2}, we have an equilibrium in which the highest
*' Later, we will show that when we have a continuum of R's, there will be realizations at the lower end where
the manager's best choice is to forego the project.
" Note that, as we mentioned in the introduction, this-result replicates the Myers and Majiuf.
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net present value project is debt financed while the remaining projects are equity financed. This
immediately implies that it is possible that negative net present value projects will be undertaken.
This happens because the issuing price is large enough to compensate the original stockholders
yet equal to the new stockholders' expectation of the future stock price in full knowledge of the
fact that there is a positive probability that the manager is financing a negative net present value
project. So we see that for debt costs in this range, only the better projects are debt financed.
Finally, if the additional costs of issuing debt are large, it is possible that every project is equity
financed.
Section 3: Analysis of the Model.
We assume that R has a distribution function, F, with support [Re, Rh] and that Ri <
I + C < Rh. As before, we must analyze the manager's decision for each possible R. However, we
can simplify the task by considering a manager's choice when R is less than I + C or when R is at
least I+C.
If the manager debt finances this project, then it must be the case that the new (post invest-
ment) stock price must be at least as large as the pre-investment stock price. Formally, this means
that he debt finances if
V+R-I-C V
n n
Obviously, this is satisfied if R> I+ C and is not otherwise. In the former case, the manager either
debt or equity finances the project while in the latter case, he either equity finances or foregoes it.
To equity finance when R < I + C, it must be the case that
V+R V
n +nl -n'
because foregoing the project is this manager's best alternative to equity financing. Substituting
for n1, and rewriting yields
VI
TLR
We are defining 4(R) as the minimum issuing price that induces a manager with a project of'
quality R to equity finance it. That is, if the manager can issue new shares at a price greater than
or equal to .2 then he will equity finance a project with R <[I+C.
12
To equity finance when R I + C requires that the return to the existing shareholders should
exceed the return under the best alternative, which is debt financing in this case. That is,
V+R V+R-I-C
n+n1~ n
Substituting for ni and rearranging yields
I[V+ R-I-C]
n[I + C|
The game representation of our model is the same as in the example. The structure of the
game is that the manager chooses first and the investor,3 3 after observing the manager's choice,
decides whether to invest in the project if it is undertaken.3 4
Somewhat more carefully, the manager chooses a function, o-(R), which says what his decision
is as a function of his private information, R. The investor chooses a function which says whether
or not he will purchase the issued shares at the issuing price. Thus, the manager chooses an issue
price, p, to maximize ) if this can be made larger than the maximum of (i) the returns to
the original stockholders from debt financing, V+n1-C and (ii) the returns from foregoing the
project, n. If not, the manager chooses which of (i) or (ii) he prefers. If p(R) is the actual price
per share that the firm's shares trade for once R is known, then the investor chooses his function
to maximize E[p(R) | p] - p. That is, the investor chooses to purchase shares only if this value is
non-negative.
Thus, we have a signaling game in which the manager is the sender and the investor is the
receiver. We provide only a heuristic definition of equilibrium here. An equilibrium is a pair
of functions, one for the manager and one for the investor and a set of beliefs for the investor
with the following properties. (1) Given the strategy choice and the beliefs of the investor, the
manager's function maximizes the value of a share held by an original stockholder for each possible
realization of R. (2) Given the function chosen by the manager, the investor chooses a function
that maximizes his returns from purchasing the firm's stock remembering that he may choose to
purchase no shares. (3) Whenever possible, the investor's beliefs should satisfy Bayes' rule. We
33 We can take the set of identical investors to act as if they were one investor because we have limited their
strategic possibilities to choosing whether or not to purchase the newly issued shares.
* Recall that we have assumed that if the manager debt finances, R is revealed immediately but that if he
equity finances R is revealed to the investor at the same time that it is revealed to the market.
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choose to employ a refinement of this equilibrium, the intuitive criterion, due to Kreps [1984] in
order to reduce the number of equilibria to a unique, sensible equilibrium. For details, see the
Appendix.
We begin by computing the set of types3 5 that pool in equilibrium for any set of feasible
parameter values. Our situation is somewhat unusual in that the minimum issuing price that
is acceptable to the manager is not monotone in R. As shown above, the manager's next best
alternative differs depending upon whether or not R < 1+ C. We find that the minimum acceptable
issuing price, 4(R), is decreasing in R for R < I-f C and is increasing in R for R > I + C. Thus,
for any issuing price the set of types that prefer to issue equity at that price may not include either
R's near Rt or near Rh. In other words, we must compute both the lowest and the highest values
of R such that the manager equity finances a project of those qualities.
If the equilibrium pooling price is p, the lowest value of R for which the manager prefers to
equity finance will be denoted by R,(p) and satisfies p = n . Thus, if R,(p) < I + C, then
(1) R.(p)= --
np
Note that this is independent of C because the next best alternative is to forego the project.
Similarly, the highest value of R for which the manager prefers to equity finance will be denoted
by R*(p) and it satisfies p = V+R-r-C l. Thus, if R*(p) > + C, then
n(I+C) .huiR() 1 Cte
np(C + I)
(2) R*(p) = +C-V+.
In the Appendix, we show that R*(p) > 1+ C and R.(p) < 1+ C for all p n(+) which is the
value of a share if R = I + C and the project is debt financed.36
In equilibrium, the investors must be willing to purchase the issued shares. This means that
given the manager's equilibrium strategy, the expected value of a newly issued share must be at
least its purchase price. Since we have assumed that the manager 's strategy is to forego the project-
as We revert to the standard short-hand "types" to avoid the more cumbersome "R's such that the manager
with a project of quality R".
36 T1his is the smallest acceptable issuing price for any value R. Since no one would prefer to issue equity for
a lower price, regardless of R, the investors should infer from such an issuing price that someone chose a
non-maximizing strategy. This means that no belief is sensible. In this case, we assume that the investors'
beliefs are such that the shares are purchased. One set of beliefs which are sufficient to generate this result are
the investors' original prior.
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if I < R, (p), to equity finance it at the issuing price p if R E [R,(p), R*(p)] or to debt finance
it ift R > R*(p), issuing equity at p signals to the investors that R E [R.(p), R*(p)]. Formally,
this means that E[R |jp] E[R I R E [R,(p), R*(p)]]. Therefore, since the investors must wish to
)lrchase the newly issued equity, the issue price p must satisfy p < V+E[RIRE[ (P),R*(p)]]The
niiique, sensible equilibrium issuing price is the largest one that satisfies this equation and we.
idenote it by pe*.37 We note that if pe < n then in equilibrium, only positive NPV projects are
undertaken. Otherwise, some negative NPV projects will be equity financed. (See Figure 1.)
The intuition for these results is as follows. We satisfy the equation with equality because the
issuing price is chosen by the manager prior to the investors' decision. Since the manager wishes
to maximize the terminal value of an old share, the manager wishes to issue at the highest price
acceptable to the new investors. Thus, the issuing price will satisfy the equation with equality. It is
the largest price that satisfies the equation because the investors' beliefs at any of the other prices
fail to be sensible. That is, to support any other price that satisfies the equation, the investors'
must believe that the manager makes a non-maximizing choice for some values of R. In the
Appendix, we show that we have a unique equilibrium in which there is the possibility of observing
all three choices: debt financing of the project, equity financing of the project and foregoing the
project, and is depicted in Figure 2. Further, we show that pe satisfies
(3) npe =V -I+ E[R | pI .
Our next task is to establish conditions under which R*(pe) < Rh. If this inequality holds,
then we will have an equilibrium in which for some values of R, the manager debt finances the
project but for other values, he equity finances it. Recall that
C +I
R*(pe)= -p V + I +C
C+I C
=-- IE[R IpeI+vER|p*] + -V,
I I
where the latter expression follows from substituting for rupe from (3). Since F[R |pe] < Rh, there
exists a C > 0 such that Rh > R*(p*). Hence, for C > 0, but small enough, our equilibrium has
both debt and equity issued. For the remainder of the paper, we focus on this case.
* We show that there is at least one solution and in the event that there are multiple solutions, all but the
largest fail to satisfy Kreps' criterion.
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We have now established the existence of a unique signaling equilibrium with the properties
that one may observe any of three decisions by the firm's manager/He may choose to debt finance
the new project, he may choose to equity finance it or he may forego the project altogether. We
have also provided sufficient conditions for this to occur.
Before doing the comparative static analysis, we must consider the consequences of eliminating
the assumption that the manager is precommitted to undertake any project for which he raises
funds. Fortunately, dropping this assumption causes only minor changes in the analysis. In
particular, the decision to equity finance a negative NPV project is affected. If the manager
does not have to undertake such a project, then if the issuing price, p, is not less than , he will
equity finance, not undertake the project and, thus, transfer wealth from new to old stockholders.
Hence, if the equilibrium issuing price exceeds , then R*(pe) = R. Otherwise, R*(pe) = 1.
With this adjustment, all of the analysis done above can be replicated to show that the qualitative
conclusions do not change. We include a brief discussion of the effects of dropping this assumption
on our comparative statics results at the end of the next section.
Section 4: Comparative Statics.
There are a number of exogenous parameters that may vary. Those that are of interest include
the cost of debt financing,3 8 C, the value of assets in place, V, and the cost of the project, I. We
begin by varying C because this permits us to consider the consequences of higher or lower debt
costs on the extent of debt financing in the economy.
Comparative statics cannot be done in the usual way because the unique equilibrium issuing
price is the maximum issuing price at which the conditional expected value of a share is equal to
the issuing price, and the "maximum" function is not differentiable. So, we adopt an approach
which is slightly more cumbersome but which has the advantage of providing a global rather than a.
local result. We study how the expectation function, E[p(R) | 1R E [R, (pe), R*(pe")]] shifts when C
changes for a given pe. Knowing this, we can then determine whether the new equilibrium issuing
38 Since we have not yet allowed the original number of outstanding shares, n, to vary, we rnay consider changes
in the cost of debt financing to be changes in the per share cost rather than in the total cost. When changes in
n are considered below, we will have to be careful and keep in mind that the additional cost of debt is invariant
to changes in sn.
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price rises or falls and whether it becomes more or less likely that the firm's project is equity
financed.
Turning to the effects of an increase in C, we recognize that the shift in the expectation function
(, depends completely on how R*(pe) changes when C changes.3 9 From (2), it can be seen that R*(pe)
- increases as C increases. Thus, the conditional expectation function, E[R I R E [R*(pe), R*(pe)]I
shifts up when C rises and causes a higher new equilibrium issuing price. Thus, an increase in C
raises the issuing price of new equity and increases the range of R that is equity financed. We refer
to this latter fact as an increase in the proportion or volume of projects that are equity financed.
This is an acceptable interpretation under the assumption that there are many firms facing the
choice studied here.
Next, we look at the effect of an increase in V holding n constant. This is equivalent to
examining the effects on financing decisions due to changes in pA induced by an increase in V.
From (1) and (2), we know that holding pe constant, an increase in V causes R*(pe) to rise and
R*(pe) to fall. Thus the effect on the conditional expected value of R of an increase in V, holding
pe constant, is ambiguous. Since we cannot determine this effect, we cannot draw any inferences
about the volume of equity financed projects. (See figures 3 and 4.)
The intuition is that, holding pe constant, an increase in V has a direct effect of reducing the
set of negative NPV projects because the loss from the worst of these projects is no longer covered
by the wealth transfer from the new to the old stockholders. Analogously, the direct effect on the
set of positive NPV projects is to reduce the number financed by equity because the losses from
financing at the given issue price rise as a result of the increased transfer of wealth from the old
to the new stockholders. Consequently, we cannot determine whether the conditional expectation
of R rises or falls because it depends on the relative magnitudes of the changes in the lower and
upper limits. This also means that we cannot assess the indirect effects of an increase in V through
the change in the equilibrium issuing price and, as a result, are unable to determine the effects of
a change in V on the volume of equity financing.
An alternative is to consider the effect of an increase in n holding V constant. This is just
another way to consider the effect of a change in the per share value of the assets in place. Since the
* This is because R.(pe) is independent of C for a given p* as can be seen from (1).
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additional costs of debt are invariant to the original number of shares outstanding, C is constant in
n. Therefore, we see from (3) that a change in n does not change the product npe. Examining the
equations defining R*(pe) and R*(pe), we see that since n does not change npe, the set of equity
financed projects is not altered.40
Finally, we consider the effect of an increase in I. By not changing the distribution function
of R or its support, this is equivalent to considering a firm whose whole set of projects is of lower
net present value. Examining the defining functions for R*(pe) and R*(pe), if pe is held fixed
R*(pe) rises as I rises but the effect on R*(pe) is ambiguous. Thus, the effect of an increase in
I on the conditional expectation of R is ambiguous. However, there is reason to believe that the
expectation function falls.41 If it does, then an increase in I lowers the equilibrium issuing price.
Unfortunately, this means that the effect of an increase in I on the volume of equity financed
projects is ambiguous.
A large portion of the difficulty that we have in determining the effects of a change on the
volume of equity financed projects stems from the very minimal assumptions that we have made
on the underlying prior distribution function of the new investors. With more structure, more
concrete predictions are possible. With this in mind, we specialize to the case in which R is
uniformly distributed on the interval [Re, Rh] and assume that I > C.
Doing the necessary computations, we find that
1
E[R I R E [R*(pe), R*(pe)]] [R*(pe)+ R e)
Substituting this expression into (3) and solving for npe yields42
_ IV
(4) npe - (I -C)'
40 This occurs because changes in the number of shares outstanding conveys no inforrnation about the value of
the project in our model.
4' Recall that p(R) = ~[+R]. Thus, E[p(.R) | R E [R.(p'),.R*(pe)] = p'[V+E[RIRE[R p*),*(p)]]. Even
though the conditional expectation of R is arnbiguous, the only case in which the conditional expectation of
p(R) rises is when the percentage increase in the conditional expectation of R swamps the direct effect, of the
increase in I. We do not believe that this is lkely to occur.
42 Substitution gives np* = V - I + (1/2)[fg + .i+ C - V + C9np*] Rearranging, we get L9. (npe )2 - (V -
I + C)npe - IV = 0. Using the quadratic formula and noting that the term under the square root is a perfect.
square ((V - C + 1)2), we get equation (4') in the text.
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This equation is the basis for the comparative statics that we intend to do. We begin by




This implies that the issue price rises when V increases. To study the effect on the volume of
equity financed projects, we need to compute dR()and .dR*(p The former is,
dR*(pe) d IV d
=- -=-I-C =0.
dV dV npe dV
The direct effect of an increase in V is that the marginal project that is equity financed rather
than foregone is of a higher quality. The reason for this is that when V was lower, the marginal
project was the one that resulted in a sufficient wealth transfer so that the existing shareholders
were as well off as if the project had been foregone. With a larger V, the "sufficient" wealth
transfer must be larger. Hence, the quality of the marginal project that is equity financed must
increase. The indirect effect of an increase in the equilibrium issuing price is to give the manager
an incentive to not forego certain low value projects because the higher issuing price means that
more wealth can be transferred from new to old stockholders. As our computations show, these
two effects just offset.
Turning to the computation of dR?', we see thatdV
dR*(pe) C + I Onpe 2C
=___ --- 1= .
dV I OV I-C'
Clearly, this is positive. Therefore, in this case, we see that an increase in V increases the value of
the highest valued project that is equity financed. In other words, projects that would have been
debt financed if V had been lower are now equity financed.
The second term, -1, is the direct effect of an increase in V. It is negative because an increase
in V leads to a greater dilution of the original shareholders' wealth, holding the issue price fixed.
However, the indirect effect (the first term) is to increase the value of this marginal project because
the issue price rises when V increases. With the uniform distribution, the indirect effect outweighs
the direct effect. Hence, the equilibrium issuing price rises as V rises and the volume of equity
financed projects also increases. Further, we notice that pe is affected by V in two ways. First, it
is increased because rises and, second, it rises if E[R |p*] rises. The latter occurs because the
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lowest valued, equity financed project remains unchanged bat the highest valued, equity financed
project rises. As a result, our model predicts that the magnitude of the change in the stock price
due to equity financing varies positively with V.
Next, consider an increase in I. As above, we begin by computing '. From (4), and after
some simplification, we obtain4 3
onpe _ -CV
or (r- C)2
It remains to determine the effect of a change in I on the volume of equity financed projects.
We first compute the effect on the low value marginal equity financed project and then the effect
on the high value marginal project.
dR -d IV d
= - - =-(I-C)=1.
dIdI IY- dI
Unfortunately, the computation of (. is not so straightforward.
dR* d V(I+C) 1
dR - -V+r+C) = (I -C) -2VC].
dI dl I - C (I-C)2
Without additional restrictions, this derivative is unsignalble. However, rewriting it as
dR* 2VC
dI ( - r-C) 2 '
immediately shows that it is always less than or equal to 1. Since - = 1, we see that for all
C > 0, d > . This implies that an increase in I reduces the set of equity financed projects
just as a decrease in V does.
We are left with the task of explaining how the comparative statics we have done yield testable
implications of our theory. Our model is an analysis of a single firm's decision. By studying how
the decision is affected by changes in the underlying parameters, we are able to do cross-sectional
comparisons. That is, if we know how the decision is made for different values of the exogenous
parameters, we are able to infer how the decision should vary across firms.
For example, we have shown that firms with higher additional costs of debt do more equity
financing, ceteris paribus. We have also shown that an increase in V leads to an increase in the
'4 This result is consistent with the claim we made for a general distribution function.
20
issuinug price and an increase in the volume of equity financed projects. This means that if one
exaniies the financing decisions of firms that differ only with respect to the value of their original
assets, we predict that the volume (percentage) of equity financed projects is higher for the firm
with the higher V. Similarly, if we compare firms that differ only in the quality of the set of
projects under consideration, our theory predicts that the firm with the better projects should
equity finance a larger proportion of them.44
Thus, according to our model, the proportion of equity financed projects should vary, across
firms directly with the differences in their pre-investment stock prices. Since this stock price can
be decomposed into two parts, the portion attributed to the value of the assets in place and the
one due to the expected value of the new project. Since an increase in V and/or a decrease in I
results in a higher pre-investment stock price, our conclusion follows. This does not necessarily
imply that the change in the stock price is larger with greater assets in place. However, we can
use our model to show this result too. Recall that when we analyzed the effect of an increase in
the value of assets in place, we saw that the original stock price must have been higher but we also
saw that the set of projects that are equity financed got better. By "got better," we mean that
the lowest valued, equity financed project remained unchanged but that the highest valued, equity
financed project increased. These facts combine to show that the investor's expected value of the
equity financed project increases. This means that the change in the firm's stock price is larger
than the change in the stock price of another firm which is identical to this firm in all respects
except that V is lower. This implies that firm size should have a positive correlation with the
change in the stock price.
Unfortunately, some of the cross-sectional test may be very difficult to perform. However,
there is an alternative way to view the comparative statics results that may yield additional hy-
potheses that are more readily tested. This involves viewing the comparative statics as statements
about a time series. This interpretation uses the following idea. Suppose that we observe firms
through time and observe variations in their stock price. Further, suppose that these variations
are correlated in the sense that periodically the market is low priced and periodically high priced.
If we can relate our comparative static results to the firm's stock price, then our theory yields a
prediction concerning the percentage of equity financed projects across periods when the market
*' As noted earlier, if I is increased holding the set of Rs constant, the result is a reduction in the quality of the
set of projects available because it lowers the NPV of every project.
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is low versus when it is high.
Above, we use the effects of changes in V and I to make predictions based on observed
differences in the stock prices of different firms. Now, we use them to make predictions about a
single firm's actions (and hence, the market's actions) as the stock price changes. The effects of
changes in V and I can be used to provide an explanation for why more equity financing is done
when stock prices are high. If one is willing to assume that the distribution of projects is not
correlated with movements in the value of the original assets for all firms, then our theory predicts
that when stock prices are high the percentage of all projects that are equity financed should be
higher. The reason for this is that the firm's stock price may be high for either of two reasons,
(i) that it has a large value of assets in place or (ii) that it has a better set of projects available.
We have shown that in either case, the set of equity financed projects increases. Hence, our model
predicts that the observed volume of equity financing should be higher when the firm's stock price
is high.
To summarize, in addition to providing a model in which debt financing, equity financing
and foregoing are observed in equilibrium, we provide an explanation for the relationship between
stock prices and equity financing as noted by Taggart [1977] and Marsh [1982] (and the references
therein), and referred to as a puzzle by Myers [1984]. Our work also suggests an explanation for
why the firm's size is an important explanatory variable when one studies the effect of financing
decisions on stock prices.
Again, before leaving this topic, we wish to describe the effects of dropping the assumption
that the manager is precommitted to undertaking all projects for which he has received funding.
If the equilibrium issuing price is such that R*(pe) = I, then the above computations remain
unchanged. In the event that R*(pe) = Re, then the computations differ slightly in an obvious
way. These computations show that all of the results reported remain unchanged and so our
qualitative conclusions do not depend upon whether there is precommitment or not.4 5
4s The computations referred to are available from the authors upon request.
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Section 5: Conclusion.
We have studied how the manager decides whether to undertake a new project and how to
* finance it under the assumption that the manager acts in the best interests of the old stockholders.
* Our. unique equilibrium has the manager choosing to finance the best projects with debt, the
intermediate projects with equity and foregoing the worst. In this equilibrium, all equity issued to
finance a new project is issued at the same price. This may permit some negative NPV projects to
be equity financed. This follows from the fact that the old stockholders can be made better off by
the wealth transfer from the new stockholders. Our example shows that it is possible for the stock
price to fall upon the announcement of its decision to equity finance the new project and provides
a potential explanation for this generally observed phenomenon.
Our comparative statics analysis showed that an increase in the additional costs of debt results
in a greater use of equity financing. More importantly, an increase in the value of assets in place
leads to a greater use of equity financing. This increase is due to the equity financing of additional
high valued projects with no change in the equity financed low value projects. Consequently, it
follows that the firm with the higher assets in place sees a larger increase (smaller decrease) in
its stock price after the announcement. When we increase the profitability of the set of potential
projects, we find that the volume of equity financing goes up. Since either of these two effects may
be causing an increase in the stock price of the firm, our analysis is able to explain why the volume
of equity financing increases when the stock market is high.
We believe that an extension of our model which includes other types of financing instruments
like retained earnings, convertible debt, etc. will provide a more complete understanding of how
the firm signals its private information. This type of extension, in the spirit of some recent work
cited in the introduction, will permit an analysis of the choice of optimal signaling instrument and
may also provide insight into other outstanding puzzles.
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Appendix.
We begin by providing a definition of the equilibrium and then proceed to prove the claims
made in the text.
As in the text, let the manager's strategy be a function, a, from project types, R, to the
decision set D = {d, (e,p), f}, which stands for the choice of debt financing, equity financing and
the issuing price or foregoing the project respectively. Thus, a : [Rt, Rh] -+ D, and the manager's
strategy space is the set of maps from [Re, Rh] to D. Since all of the investors have the same
priors, we will represent them as one player. Having the same priors means that they will have the
same posterior, conditional on observing some x E D. In turn, this implies that either they all are
willing to acquire the new shares or none are. Therefore, we can simplify the game by solving as
if there is one investor. This investor's strategy is a function from the manager's decision set to a
decision to buy or not buy. Let B = {buy, not buy} and let s : D -+ B.
With these conventions, an equilibrium is a pair of strategies, one for the manager and one
for the investor, o*(R), s*(x), and a belief function, p(R I x) that satisfy the following properties:
(1) given s*(x) and p(R I x), a*(R) maximizes the manager's objective function, the value
of a share, for R E [RI, Rh],
(2) given o* and p(R I x), s*(x) maximizes the investor's objective function, and
(3) given o*, p(R I x) satisfies Bayes' rule whenever possible.
To interpret the last restriction, let *~ 1(x) be the set of R's for which u* says "choose decision
x." Then, the last restriction means that if *-1 (x) is not empty, then the investor's probability
that R < r is the conditional probability that R < r given that R E a*~ (x). More formally, if
R E *~ (x), where we intend this set to be non-empty, then
F(R+) - F(R-)
j-=frE X) F(dr)
What this means is that if the observation of the manager's choice is one that should arise from
the use of the manager's equilibrium strategy, then the investor should believe that the probability
that the value of the project is R is simply the conditional probability that it is R given the set of
project values that would have induced the manager to make the same decision.
As mentioned in the text, we will restrict attention to the set of sensible equilibria as deter-
mined by Kreps' Intuitive Criterion. Kreps' criterion is a restriction on the off-the-equilibrium
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path beliefs that one may use to support an equilibrium. The idea is to consider some unsent
message x' and ask whether it could have been used to break the equilibrium. The answer is yes if
the following conditions hold. First, one must be able to find a subset of the types (R's) such that
if the value of the project is an element of this subset, then the manager does not wish to deviate
to this unsent message no matter how the investor interprets the message. Second, for the com-
plementary set, it must be true that if the investor concentrates his beliefs on this complementary
set and chooses a best action given this restriction, the manager with a project in this set must
prefer to deviate to the unsent message regardless of which best action the investor chooses.46
Having defined what will constitute an equilibrium, we turn to proving the statements in the
text.
Lemma 1: In equilibrium, R*(p) I + C.
Proof: First consider the case in which there is equity financing and suppose that R*(p) < I + C.
We immediately have a contradiction because if R*(p) < I+ C then
E [R I R E [R* (p), R*(p)]] < I+ C.
Since ((R) is declining for R < I + C, there is an R, I + C > R > R*(pe), such that 4(R) <
. (R*(pe)). Since this firm's minimum issuing price is smaller than R*(pe)'s, it prefers equity
financing to foregoing. Further, since R < I + C, it prefers foregoing to debt financing. Hence, we
have a contradiction: the R firm has an incentive to deviate and equity finance the project.
Next, consider the case in which no equity is issued. In this case, the manager with R = I + C is
foregoing the project because of the additional cost of debt C. Further, since C is strictly positive,
there is a 6 > 0 such that VR E [I + C,-I + C + 6], the manager is also choosing to forego the project.
However, if the manager with a project of this type chooses to issue equity at {, the value of an
existing share will increase. This follows because the investors will purchase such shares because
the issue price indicates that R > I since any firm with R < I would forego the project rather
than fund a negative net present value project by issuing shares at this price. Further, if R > I,
the manager is strictly better off issuing new shares and accepting the positive net present value
p)roject than foregoing it. Hence, we have a contradiction and together with the argument in the
previous paragraph, this shows that R*(p) I + C. I
Lemma 2: In equilibrium, R,( p) < I + C.
46 For the details, see Kreps [1984].
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Proof: Again, the proof is by contradiction. So, suppose that R(p) > f+ C. First note that the
smallest of the minimum acceptable issuing price is ,JiC). Second, since R*(p) I + C, the
investor must, in equilibrium, expect that the firm is choosing a non-negative NPV project and,
as a result, be willing to pay more then n for a newly issued share. So, the only way to support
an equilibrium in which the firm issues at a lower price than the largest that is acceptable to the
investor is to choose off-the-equilibrium path beliefs such that a deviation to a larger issuing price
is not profitable. In this case, this is possible only if the investor chooses not to buy the issued
shares at the larger price. However, these beliefs are not sensible.
They are not sensible because the conditional expectation function is continuous. That is, if the
larger price is p + 6 for some 6 > 0, there is an E£> 0 such that E[p(R) I p + 6] - E[p(R) | p] < E.
Since E[p(R) j p] > p, there is a 6 > 0 such that if the investor concentrates his beliefs on the set of
project values for which the deviation to p + 6 is profitable, the investor's best response is to buy
the shares. Since this means that the shares are issued at a higher price, the presumed deviating
types are better off. Thus, we need only show that no other type would prefer to deviate if the
investor chooses a best response to this deviation for any beliefs about who might be deviating.
This is straightforward if one chooses as the original deviating set the set of firms for whom the
minimum acceptable issuing price is not larger than p + 6. Then, for any project value not in
this set, selling newly issued shares at p + 6 is strictly worse than their next best alternative if
the investor purchases the shares and is strictly worse for firms that would have debt financed the
project if the investor does not purchase the shares. If the firm would have foregone the project
otherwise, then if the investor chooses not to buy the shares, then the manager is worse off for
having spent the resources to issue equity.
Proposition 1: There are no equilibria in which the value of an undertaken project is revealed.
Proof. Again, suppose not. The first two lemmas show that, in equilibrium, the set of firms that
issue equity include firms with R <I+ C and firms with R> I + C. Hence, in a separating
equilibrium, there is a set of firms choosing to equity finance the project. Since we have supposed
a separating equilibrium, it must be the case that for this set of firms, the issuing price reveals the
project's value. That is, the issuing price must be a monotonic function of R for 1R is the set of R's
which are equity financed. Since it is a monotonic function and since there are, at least, two firms
issuing equity (by lemmas 1 and 2), there are at least two distinct issuing prices. Label then so
that P1 > p2. For this to be an equilibrium, no firm type must wish to deviate from its equilibrium
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action. In particular, the R associated with issuing shares at p2, say R2 , must not wish to deviate.
In addition, if we consider deviations to actions that are observable in equilibrium, that is actions
that can be generated by the manager's equilibrium strategy for some R E [Re, Rh], then we need
not worry about off-the-equilibrium path beliefs. So let R2 contemplate deviating to p1. Doing
so allows this firm to issue equity at a higher price. It is purchased because the investor purchases
the issued shares by the firm that is supposed to issue at p1. Hence, the R2 firm is strictly better
off.I
Proposition 2: The equilibrium issue price satisfies p = E[p(R) I p].
Proof: First, notice that p < E[p(R) I p]. This follows from the observation that were it false,
the investor would not purchase the newly issued shares as they are being sold for more than he
expects them to be worth. Second, by an argument analogous to that used to prove the previous
proposition, if p < E[p(R)| p], it is supported by beliefs that are not sensible. I
Lemma 3: For all p > pe, p > E[p(R)I p].
Proof: Suppose not. Then for some p > pe, E[p(R) Ip] ;> p. It is immediate from the definition of
pe that this inequality must be strict for all p > pe. (Otherwise, since the conditional expectation
is continuous, there would be another p > pe such that E[p(R) I p] = p which is inconsistent with
the definition of pe.) But this cannot be because there is a p sufficiently large, say p, such that for
all p> p, E[p(R) | p] is constant. This follows from the fact that the support of the distribution
function F is closed. Thus, simply compute the minimum issuing price acceptable to a firm with
R = Re and with R = Rh. Choose the larger of these minimum issuing prices and identify it with
pl. At this issuing price, all firms prefer to issue equity rather than their next best alternative.
IIence, E[p(R)| p] = E[p(R)], a constant. I
Proposition 3: There is a p > n hi+C) such that p = E[p(R) I p].
Proof In lemma 2, we showed that if p = n(I+c), then p < E[p(R) p ]. In lemma 3, we showed
that there was a p, labelled p, such that for all p > p, E[p(R) Ip] = E[p(R)]. Since the conditional
expectation function is continuous, there exists a p, sayp' such that p' = EIp(R) | p']. I
T heorem 1: The unique sensible equilibrium has
d RE (R*(p*), Rh]-*R)= {(e~P) R E ,p (~
f R E [Re, R*(p*))
where pe is the largest issuing price such that pe = E[p(R) j p*] and the investor purchases the
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issued debt and equity. Finally, the investor's beliefs are that (e,p) implies that R E [R,(p), R*(p)],
f implies that R E [Re, R*(pe)) and that d implies that R E (R*(pe), Rh].
Proof: For pe to define an equilibrium a number of things must be true. First, if R < R*(pe) then
the manager must prefer to forego the project rather than equity or debt finance it. Second, if
R E [R*(pe), R*(pe)] then the manager must prefer to issue equity at pe rather than either of the
other options. Third, if R > R*(pe), then the manager must prefer to debt finance the project.
Taking each in turn, the first is satisfied because R*(pe) < I + C. In other words, because the
manager's next best alternative is to forego the project and the issuing price is smaller than the
minimum issuing price that increases the current stockholders' wealth: if R < R*(pe), then the
minimum issuing price that is acceptable to the manager is larger than the equilibrium issuing
price. Thus, in this situation, the manager prefers to forego the project rather than issue equity
at pe. By the same reasoning, the manager would prefer to forego the project rather than issue
equity at any lower price.4 7 However, this is not sufficient to show that a manager in this situation
would choose to forego the project. The reason is that we must ensure that he does not prefer to
issue equity at some other price.
So, consider the possibility that the manager issues equity at some larger price p'. Notice
that by construction, this is an off-the-equilibrium path signal and thus the investors' off-the-
equilibrium path beliefs come in to play.4 8 We employ the following off-the-equilibrium path
beliefs. As we show below, these are the beliefs which are consistent with Kreps' Intuitive criterion
and result in a unique sensible equilibrium. The investor's beliefs are that any off-the-equilibrium
path issuing price would be used by the manager for every R such that the new issuing price
makes the original owners of the firm at least as well off as the equilibrium action. That is, the
investor computes the set of R's such that if R is a member of this set, then issuing at the off-
the-equilibrium path issuing price is at least as good as the equilibrium action. From above, we
know that for a larger issuing price, the set of R's that prefer to issue at this price rather than
undertake their next best alternative strictly contains [R*(pe), R*(pe)]. However, we have pe equal
to the largest issuing price at which E[p(R) | R E [R,(p"), R*(pe = pe. Hence, at this higher
issuing price, p', the investors will not purchase the shares which will immediately imply that if
47 This preference is independent of the investors' best reply to the deviation because the reply to issuing at
this price that makes the manager's payoff largest (to purchase the issued shares) is insufficient to induce the
manager to issue the shares at this price.
48 It is these types of situations that cause the off-the-equilibrium path beliefs to play such a large role in
determining what is or is not an equilibrium.
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the manager's project has R < R*(pe) then he will prefer to forego the project.
To explain why pe is the largest issuing price such that the issue price is equal to the conditional
expectation of p(R), we need to recall a couple of facts. First, <b(R) is increasing in R for R >
I + C and is decreasing in R for R < I + C. Further, there is a large enough issuing price
such that the manager prefers to issue equity and such that increasing the issuing price does not
change the manager's decision, regardless of the value of R. This immediately implies that if,
regardless of the value of R, the manager issues equity at the issuing price, then the issuing price
does not reveal any information. Together, these imply that there is an issuing price, p, such
that E[p(R) | R E [R.(3), R*((p)]] = E[p(R)] for all p > p. Second, our assumptions about the
distribution function of R as well as the fact that both R.(p) and R*(p) are continuous ensure
that E[p(R) I R E [R*(pe), R*(pe)]] is a continuous function of p. Next, we combine this with
the obvious fact that either pe > p or not. If pe > p then for all p > pe, p > E[p(R) I p] =
E[p(R) I R E [R.(p), R*(p)]] = E[p(R)]. That is, if the equfibri~um issuing price is not smaller
than the issuing price that induces equity financing for all values of R, then increases in the issuing
price cannot change E[p(R) I R E [R.(p), R*(p)]]. Thus, since pe is the largest price such that
p = E[p(R) I R E [R.(p), R*(p)]], any increase in the issuing price causes p > E[p(R) I R E
[R, (p), R*(p)]]. Since the investors would refuse to purchase shares issued at a price such that
p > E[p(R) I R E [R.(p), R*(p)]], this deviation is unprofitable. In the other case, pe <7p, we know
that for all p > pe, p > E[p(R) I R E [R.(p), R*(p)]]. Again, deviations to such an issuing price
results in the investors refusing to purchase the issued shares. If they do not buy the issued shares,
the manager prefers not to deviate. Thus, we have shown that when R < R*(pe), the manager's
best choice is to forego the project.
Next, consider the case in which the manager's project's quality is R E [R*(pe), R*(pe)]. Obviously,
this manager prefers to equity finance the project rather than his next best alternative, regardless
of which alternative is best. However, we must again show that there is no alternative issuing price
which he prefers. As above, he clearly will not prefer a lower issuing price because, at best, he
would be throwing money away. To show that he does not prefer a higher issuing price, we simply
use the argument above to show that for all larger issuing prices, p > E[p(R)|I R E [R.(p), R*(p)I].
Again, this implies that the investors would refuse to purchase the issued shares and this means
that the manager's optimal choice is to issue equity at pe.
Lastly, we must show that the manager will choose to debt finance a project if R > R*(pe). Since
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this manager's minimum acceptable issuing price exceeds pe, he would not prefer to issue equity
at a lower price. The above argument shows that the investors will not purchase equity issued at
a higher price thus making this manager prefer to debt finance the project rather than attempt
to issue equity at a price that exceeds pe. Finally, since R > I + C, the manager prefers to debt
finance the project rather than forego it. Consequently, the manager will choose to debt finance
the project if R > R*(pe). Thus, we need only show that the beliefs are sensible and that the
equilibrium is unique.
To see that the beliefs are sensible, notice that we have concentrated the investor's beliefs on the
set of firm types, say Z, that would prefer to deviate if the investor purchases the shares. This
immediately implies that the beliefs are sensible for downward deviations because no firm prefers to
deviate because such a firm would simply be issuing shares for a lower price. If there is a deviation
to a higher issuing price, then if the investor chooses to respond to the deviation by purchasing
no shares, no firm type wishes to deviate. Hence, the equilibrium involves beliefs that are not
sensible only if the investor would purchase the shares, after concentrating his beliefs on the set
Z. However, the investor will not purchase these shares in this event. This follows because pe is
the largest price such that p = E[p(R) I p]. Thus, concentrating his beliefs on Z, which is equal
to [R,(p'), R*(p')] if p' is the deviation, results in p' > E[p(R) j R E [R.(p'), R*(p')] as shown in
lemma 3. This implies that the investor would not purchase the shares.
Thus, we are left with showing that the equilibrium is unique. Our analysis of the manager's optimal
decision immediately implies that a change in either the set of firms issuing debt or foregoing the
project requires a larger issuing price. Proposition 2 showed that the set of issuing prices that
we need consider are only those that satisfy p = E[p(R) I p], and the definition of pe made it the
largest issuing price satisfying this equation. Finally, recall that Proposition 1 showed that we
could not have a separating equilibrium. As a result, we need only consider the possibility that we
get an equilibrium of the type described in Theorem 1 with a different issuing price. So, consider
an equilibrium of that type except that the issuing price is p < pe.
We proceed by showing that such an equilibrium must be supported by beliefs that are not sensible
thereby proving uniqueness. To see this, simply consider a deviation to a larger issuing price, in
particular, pe. We know that at this larger issuing price, more firms are issuing equity and less are
dIebt financing or foregoing the project. Obviously, those firms that had been foregoing the project
in the conjectured equilibrium are better off equity financing it because their minimum acceptable
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issuing price is no larger than pe. Second, note that every firm that had been issuing equity, and
still is, is better off because the shares are issued at a higher price. Third, note that the firms that
switch from debt to equity financing are better off because the issuing price is at least as large as
their minimum acceptable issuing price. Finally, note that any firm that was, and still is, either
foregoing the project or debt financing it is indifferent to the change, but strictly prefers its choice
to equity financing the project at pe. This completes the proof because these facts imply that we
can break the conjectured equilibrium.
To see this, simply consider the deviation to pe. If the investor responds by purchasing the shares,
then the set of firms that prefer to deviate to this issuing price is exactly [R,(pe), R*(pe)]. Further,
given that the investor concentrates his probability on this set, the investor is willing to purchase
the shares (by the definition of pe). Hence, if we can show that there is a set of firms that prefer
not to deviate, we are done. We identified such a set above. These are the firms that do not switch
from either foregoing the project or debt financing it.
Consequently, we have shown that the equilibrium is unique. I
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